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INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Constitutional Development commissioned the Community Agency for 
Social Enquiry (C A S E) to record and summarise the proceedings of a conference on 
“Intergovernmental Relations and Provincial Government: Fostering Mutual Co-operation” that 
took place 29-30 March 1999, and produce an analytical report based on the proceedings. The 
report seeks to summarise the main issues that emerged from the conference, put them in the 
context of on-going discussion on Intergovernmental relations (IGR), and suggest ways of 
moving forward to deal with these issues. Because the conference was conceived of as an 
opportunity to take stock of the experience of IGR and prepare for the period after the 1999 
elections, some of the proposals made here may be controversial. The reason for that is the need 
to begin to explore new options and promote discussion that does not always stick to 
conventions.  
 
PART I: ANALYTICAL REPORT  
The Context 
Taking place towards the end of term of the parliament that was elected in 1994, the conference 
provided a good opportunity to evaluate the record of IGR over the preceding five years, and 
gauge the perspectives of different players in the field. These include national and provincial 
governments, MECs in the provinces, local government representatives, the National Council of 
the Provinces (NCOP), academics and other interested parties. 
 
The basis for discussion was the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and in 
particular Chapter 3 on co-operative government. The basic principle contained in section 40 (1) 
of the Constitution is that “government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of 
government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated”. In section 41 (2) the 
Constitution also mandates an Act of Parliament “to establish or provide for structures and 
institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations”, and provide for “mechanisms 
and procedures to facilitate settlement of intergovernmental disputes”. 
 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution respectively specify the functional areas of concurrent 
national and provincial legislative competence and the functional areas of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence. The precise mechanisms to be used to co-ordinate between national and 
provincial spheres and the procedures for dealing with disputes stemming from different 
interpretations of these areas of competence are not specified in the Constitution. 
 
Against this background, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1996 (and even before that 
since the 1994 elections), intergovernmental relations developed in a manner that frequently was 
not formalised by legislation. Structures to deal with relations between the different spheres of 
government developed on the basis of need and were modified to fit changing circumstances. 
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The meaning of provisions about the respective powers of spheres emerged in practice through a 
process of negotiation and contest between national and provincial spheres. 
 
Given the incremental nature of the process and the absence of restrictive legislation to guide it 
there have been calls to formalise it and pass legislation to establish institutions and put in place 
clear mechanisms to handle IGR. To be able to decide whether this is necessary, a review of the 
record so far and of the issues that remain unresolved is needed. This paper seeks to contribute to 
this process. 
 
Unity in Diversity 
Unity in diversity has been a guiding principle of the new South Africa in many areas, including 
the system of government. It reflects recognition that the country is diverse in terms of race, 
ethnicity, culture, religion and region and at the same time enjoys a common history and destiny 
beyond these divisions. In the area of government institutions it reflects a compromise between 
unitary and federal principles of governance. This compromise was forged in the course of 
constitutional negotiation prior to the 1994 elections and it remains in force today without any 
serious challenge. 
 
As an arrangement that has its origins in a political compromise, however, unity in diversity is 
open at times to different interpretations as a result of vague formulation of its components. This 
is apparent in disagreements over the implementation of this concept. How much diversity can 
be allowed within the boundaries of unity, and to what extent can unity be maintained without 
constraining diversity, are questions that do not have fixed answers – they have been settled in 
practice on the basis of power relations. 
 
Two main types of complaints about the actual state of affairs have emerged. There are those 
who believe that the provinces either have been deviating from national policies and thus 
subverting unity. Alternatively provinces are seen to be duplicating national legislative efforts 
and institutional arrangements, and thus result in a waste of resources and a delay in delivery. At 
the same time, others claim that centralist tendencies prevail in national government and lead to 
provincial powers being ignored or bypassed. 
 
More common than these two responses which tend to look at national and provincial powers as 
being mutually exclusive, are calls for clarifying the division between national and provincial 
powers, and rationalising the structure of IGR. These calls focus on finding an effective way to 
combine national co-ordination and optimal use of resources on the one hand, with provincial 
initiative and easier access for people on the ground on the other. 
 
Since the Constitution will not change in a way that would settle these matters once and for all, 
we can expect on-going tensions over the issue. There is need for a policy to incorporate the 
strengths of the different spheres without diminishing their powers. There is no need for ten 
different policies, one national and one for each of the nine provinces. This is a costly and time-
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consuming exercise. However, there is need to accommodate provincial variations. In other 
words, one national policy should be implemented in a flexible manner to allow consideration of 
local peculiarities and constraints. 
 
This point is important when we realise that in many areas, such as health, education, housing, 
etc. policy is decided at the national level but is implemented by the provinces. There is no point 
in formulating uniform national policies only to face problems when they are being implemented 
provincially. Provincial inputs and concerns should be incorporated from the beginning of the 
national process and not as an afterthought. If the conditions in some of the provinces are such 
that the national policy cannot be applied there without significant changes, this issue must be 
anticipated and tackled before the policy is finalised to prevent exhausting and futile conflict. 
 
While unity of policy is an important principle, it must not be interpreted as uniformity in all 
respects of implementation but rather as a broad framework, which allows for different modes of 
application. The focus should be on policy principles and objectives (such as participation, 
equity, development, etc.) rather than on the technical mechanisms required in order to achieve 
these goals. Much of the discontent of some provinces arises not from a desire to challenge 
policy objectives as such, but from what they see as a tendency to prescribe particular ways of 
realising objectives. More flexibility on the part of the national sphere would help in reducing 
tensions on this basis. Ends and means must not be confused. 
 
It is possible that if provinces are given more freedom to find their own mechanisms to 
implement national policies, they will come up with creative methods of achieving agreed-upon 
goals. If these methods achieve results that are equivalent to or better than the results reached 
through the use of nationally prescribed methods, their methods may be sanctioned and even 
adopted by other provinces. In this way creativity and initiative arising from the need to deal 
with local circumstances and find appropriate solutions to concrete problems will be released. 
 
If certain provinces feel comfortable in following national prescriptions they have the right to do 
so, of course. If the provinces follow their own methods and the results are poor they can change 
their course. Only if provinces refuse to change their methods, despite clear evidence that they 
are not meeting their goals, can the national sphere exercise the right to override provincial 
powers. This will be a measure of the last resort, however. 
 
The insistence in some circles of national government on giving more powers to the national 
sphere and less autonomy to the province stems from the legacy of apartheid, which used 
arguments about self-determination, autonomy and differentiation to legitimise policies of racial 
discrimination and uneven development. Times have changed, however, and there is little to fear 
from greater experimentation by provinces in finding innovative method of reaching desirable 
goals, or moving at a somewhat different pace from each other. 
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What are the advantages of provincial autonomy in the area of implementation? This approach 
ensures that provinces take greater responsibility for their own performance. They cannot blame 
national government for blocking their initiative, ignoring their circumstances or imposing 
unrealistic deadlines. If they can implement policies at a faster rate or more efficiently they will 
be rewarded by being able to release resources to other programmes according to their own 
priorities. At the same time they also free up national resources by not forcing government to 
police them to ensure they meet their goals. On the other hand, if they under-perform and 
national government is forced to intervene, through supervision or by investing additional 
resources, they should bear the cost of such intervention. In this way efficiency and prompt 
delivery will be encouraged, poor performance penalised, and national government be made free 
to focus on the task of oversight, policy making and giving overall direction. 
 
The second advantage of this approach is that it establishes clear boundaries between the 
responsibilities of spheres, at the same time that it retains their interdependency. The blurring of 
boundaries and allocation of parallel powers is a constant source of tension because it is never 
fully clear where credit it due and where blame should be apportioned. It is also problematic in 
that it makes it difficult to draw clear lessons about the performance of each province, how it 
should be improved and what system of incentives can be used to enhance performance. 
 
All this must be done while taking care not to punish the residents of a province for the 
incompetence of its government. In other words, the basic levels of services must be maintained, 
though national intervention if necessary. 
 
Capacity and Uneven Development 
A concern that has been raised consistently about the provinces is their record of performance 
and delivery since 1994, as well as issues of corruption, waste and mismanagement that seem to 
afflict them. It can be pointed out in response to this that problems with capacity are not unique 
to the provinces, and are common to national and local governments as well. Given that in many 
areas such as health and education national government is not the main implementing agency, 
but rather is in charge of designing overall policies and maintaining norms and standards, it is 
impossible to compare the extent of capacity at these two spheres, as their tasks are different. 
 
If national government or any department within it were to assume the task of running a province 
or provincial department they would not have the capacity to do so. This is because they are not 
geared for such tasks. Their role is to facilitate implementation and service delivery by the 
provinces. Given that provincial capacities are based to a large extent on the varying legacies of 
apartheid and historical patterns of racial segregation and inequality, it is important to make sure 
that a new system of performance evaluation and incentives not serve to deepen gaps between 
provinces. 
 
This is a real problem as the best performing provinces tend to be those which enjoy greater 
prosperity (such as Gauteng and the Western Cape in many areas). Provinces that perform poorly 
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tend to be those that were disadvantaged before and are still suffering the consequences of the 
„homelands‟ policies (Eastern Cape and Northern Province among others). There is thus little 
sense in talking about provincial capacity in general. Rather we need to find ways of increasing 
the capacity of under performing and under-resourced provinces, through assistance provided by 
national government as well by better-resourced provinces. 
 
Currently all provinces are expected to perform at the same level, operating through similar 
structures. Given that starting points (financial, administrative, and personnel resource bases) are 
different this is unrealistic. To expect of government at provincial and local levels to perform to 
standards without equipping them for the task is to place an unreasonable burden on them. A 
capacity building programme must be put in place. 
 
Standards need to be stated clearly and adhered to, taking into account financial, human and 
organisational constraints. In addition mechanisms for redress and accountability should be 
created. A performance management system based on clear identification of goals, capacity, 
budget and planning is essential. It cannot be created, though, without a specific budgetary 
allocation and a monitoring and evaluation system. This is an expensive undertaking and it 
requires skilled personnel to operate it. 
 
The Department of Constitutional Development together with the Department of Public Service 
and Administration must jointly take the initiative to evaluate needs, design training programmes 
and implement them in all spheres of government. In the absence of commitment to invest in 
capacity building, the gap between the less and more endowed provinces will widen. 
 
Vertical and Horizontal Relations 
One aspect of IGR that could add another dimension to issues of capacity as well as other issues, 
but has not been tackled directly by the formal provisions of the Constitution, is the issue of 
vertical relations between provinces. The IGR system has relations between different spheres at 
its core, but not relations between different elements in the same sphere. 
 
Calls have been made in the conference by a number of provincial leaders to develop inter-
provincial relations and forums that do not have to include all the provinces at the same time, or 
to involve the national sphere. Such forums can deal with problems that involve relations 
between provinces with common boundaries or common concerns, such as taxi violence along 
certain routes, spread of HIV/AIDS, rivers, nature conservation, etc. The idea behind this is that 
there is no need to involve the Western Cape for example in discussions of violence along 
transport routes between Gauteng, Free State and KwaZulu-Natal. There may be some issues that 
can be soled in these more limited forums without involving national government and all IGR 
structures. 
 
Another use of such forums, as suggested by some provincial representatives, is that they could 
bring together provinces with different resource and capacity levels (or perhaps with 
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complementary resources) to help each other and collaborate on specific projects. While the 
national sphere could contribute to these processes as well, it is more efficient if progress can be 
made without necessarily involving all spheres to manage all issues. 
 
This approach might be opposed as privileging relationships between some provinces and not 
others, thereby creating „cliques‟, and allowing the better-endowed provinces to dominate their 
less fortunate colleagues. These may lead to the marginalisation of the national sphere as 
mechanism for co-ordinating and equalising relations between provinces. These concerns must 
be taken seriously. At the same time, experiments with different arrangements can open up new 
avenues for co-operation and development that have not been tried before. If they turn out to be 
successful they should be encouraged; if they cause problems in the relations between spheres 
they could be blocked. Either way there is room for initiative and creative experimentation of 
this nature. 
 
To ensure that such experiments do not get out of hand, the Departments of Constitutional 
Development and of Finance must play a role in monitoring these inter-provincial matters. This 
will guarantee that all players share the same broad policy basis, to prevent duplications and a 
waste of resources. The role of national departments would be facilitative, focusing on how the 
need to enable the provinces to co-ordinate their efforts. This should be accompanied by co-
ordination between local and provincial spheres of government. 
 
Cross-border partnerships 
Another issue that was raised in the conference is cross-border partnerships – the relations 
between provinces and neighbouring countries. Obviously, provinces do not have power to 
intervene in foreign affairs, and IGR structures do not deal with these at present. However, there 
are matters that may involve co-operation with other countries – for example Free State and 
Lesotho, North-West and Botswana, Mpumalanga and Mozambique. This will serve to deal with 
issues such as nature conservation (trans-frontier parks), transport and development links 
(Maputo Development Corridor), and health problems (malaria eradication, HIV/AIDS). 
 
The issues mentioned above affect people across national boundaries and they should be treated 
on an integrated basis through joint planning. There is also the general issue of delivering 
services to people from neighbouring countries, which must be dealt with in a systematic 
manner. A range of other issues that cannot be solved at the level of an individual province – 
policy regarding traditional leaders, crime, international syndicates – could be better handled 
through sharing knowledge and experience between provinces and local governments, as well as 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Arrangements to pool resources, reduce waste and learn from each other should be put in place. 
In all the cases mentioned above there is a need to enable co-operation beyond provincial and 
even national boundaries. The current IGR structures are not flexible enough to facilitate such 
co-operation and new ways should be found. They must involve oversight by the Department of 
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Foreign Affairs and the relevant national departments, but they may be led by provincial 
initiative, if the provinces in question are willing and able to do so. There is little danger that 
national sovereignty will suffer as a result. 
 
MINMECs 
Although many provincial delegates at the conference were eager to explore new partnerships 
and institutional arrangements that go beyond the existing boundaries, one arrangement that was 
not considered favourably by them is the MINMECs. Perhaps more than any other issue, the 
MINMECs were received critically by representatives of the provinces as well as the National 
Council of Provinces. 
 
At stake is the issue of provincial powers and the extent to which the operation of the MINMECs 
overrides the powers of the provincial legislature and executive to determine policy. Through 
meetings between national departments and relevant MECS from the provinces, the MINMECs 
provide an alternative channel for policy making to the established provincial channels. 
 
In principle provincial policy is determined by the executive, headed by the Premier. The MECs 
are bound by decisions taken at that forum, as well as by the deliberations of the provincial 
legislature. In practice, however, when a national minister and provincial MECs agree on policy 
issues at the MINMEC, this can result in pre-empting the work of the provincial legislature. In 
addition, the provincial executive may be faced with the need to implement policy without 
always having approved it and allocated the necessary funds for it. 
 
The problem in this arrangement is that there is no integration between the legislative and 
executive processes, and between the two parallel policy-making processes. Some delegates 
pointed out that MECs are answerable simultaneously to their provincial structures and to the 
national minister. Whether the provincial sphere is indeed accountable to the national sphere is 
debatable, and there is no constitutional provision for this principle or indeed for the MINMECs. 
 
The potential for conflict here is real, and it can be solved only by establishing clear lines of 
communication and accountability. The MINMECs are important as forums for exchange of 
ideas, debate and moving forward in creative ways, but they should not be used to bypass 
provincial processes. MECs should get a mandate from the provincial executive to present 
positions at MINMECs. If they deviate from their mandate they should go back to their 
principals and get approval for that. 
 
The NCOP 
Another question to be addresses is the role of the National Council of the Provinces (NCOP). 
The NCOP plays a role in reducing the gap between the legislative process and the public by 
encouraging debates in various parts of the country, and by giving the provinces institutional 
means to voice their concerns. The precise location of the NCOP in the legislative process may 
be problematic, however. Consultation with the provinces should take place in the course of 
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formulating legislation by the relevant departments before they submit bills to parliament, and 
the NCOP should not duplicate the process. 
 
Concern has been raised that by the time a bill comes before the NCOP, it had already gone 
through various sages of formulation and revision, and reached a degree of finality. The NCOP 
can do little at that stage to reverse the process or send the bill back to the drawing board. If the 
NCOP is not to become a rubber stamp for legislation that has passed through other bodies, it 
must be involved in the process from its inception, and play a role in initial provincial 
consultations. 
 
The NCOP can also play a role in brining all spheres of government together. It accommodates 
the voice of local government, which must have a voice in provincial legislatures as well. Both 
local and provincial governments should have structured mechanisms for making their input into 
the NCOP through the provincial legislatures. While the NCOP provides an institutional 
foundation for implementing co-operative government, its role and capacity must be 
strengthened if it is to play a more meaningful role. 
 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
The system of IGR fiscal relations seems to be working fine and was generally praised. One 
issue that remains to be solved is unfunded mandates, which result from lack of co-ordination 
between different spheres with concurrent powers over areas such as health and education. Better 
co-ordination between MINMECs and the provincial structures would help in dealing with this 
problem. The problem of capacity – people‟s ability to understand the technical language used in 
financial discussions – can be solved through proper training programmes in financial 
management. 
 
Legislation or Organic Development  
In most of the issues discussed in the conference the general feeling was that practical solutions 
must be found without creating a restrictive legislative framework. This can be done by adopting 
rules to regulate relations between spheres of government, and allowing them to change when 
circumstances require that. It is better to let relations develop organically and there is no need to 
rush to finalise matters at this stage. 
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PART II: PROCEEDINGS 
FIRST SESSION, 29/3/1999 
The conference opened on the 29
th
 March with greetings from Mr Mahlangu, the Mayor of 
Kayalami Local Council, who welcomed the delegates in the name of the council. 
 
Deputy president Mbeki, keynote address 
The Deputy President gave the keynote address of the conference. He emphasised that although 
delegates represented diverse national, provincial and local constituencies they were all united as 
South Africans. Differentiation within this unity is important and there is a need for mutual co-
operation to reconstruct and develop the country, guided by the spirit of the Constitution. 
 
The Constitution provides the framework for Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR) by allocating 
exclusive and concurrent powers to the three spheres of government. The guiding principle is the 
need to maintain overall unity through co-operative governance and partnership between the 
different spheres. There is a need to develop a culture to facilitate alignment and co-ordination 
between these spheres, so that narrow parochial boundaries can be overcome and needs be 
addressed on a coherent integrated basis. 
  
South Africa needs to learn from international experiences and recent practical challenges, and 
use them to meet the needs of the country. The IGR system must be seen in the context of social, 
political and economic realities. The institutional and legislative framework should serve to 
guide developments, not to control them. To allow it to play this role there is need to co-ordinate 
spheres effectively, develop performance mechanisms for IGR, make the role of the local sphere 
meaningful and establish procedures for settling disputes. 
 
It is time to review the performance of provinces since 1994. On the one hand, there are serious 
concerns about their capacity, and about issues of corruption, waste and mismanagement. On the 
other hand, provinces are closer and more accessible to people on the ground. To improve 
performance there is thus a need to address corruption, reduce cost, increase quality and deliver 
services. To enhance government‟s capacity to deliver, co-operation is essential. 
 
After the election government should be able to put forward proposals on how to minimise 
wastage and duplication of resources and remove blockages that prevent delivery. This will be 
done in the framework of a developmental state that is committed to public participation and 
people-driven transformation. 
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Minister Moosa, Department of Constitutional Development, opening presentation 
Minister Moosa asserted that after the 1999 elections, government would adopt a new policy on 
IGR institutional mechanisms. This policy will address the structure and role of the Inter-
Governmental Forum (IGF), which has grown organically without prescription or legislation, 
develop conflict resolution mechanisms, and address other relevant issues. 
 
Among the issues to be addressed is the difference between local and provincial spheres of 
government. Local governments operate through a national association, but their provincial 
counterparts do not speak with a collective voice (the Premiers‟ Forum does not play that role). 
There is a gap between the local sphere on the one hand and provincial and national spheres on 
the other. The latter work on similar issues, while the competencies and roles of local 
government are different. 
 
Another question to be addresses is the role of the National Council of the Provinces (NCOP). 
The NCOP can play a role in reducing the gap between the legislative process and the public by 
encouraging debates in various parts of the country. However, the NCOP is duplicating the 
process of consultation with the provinces, which is already carried out by government 
department before they submit bills to parliament. 
 
Handling IGR can be done without creating a restrictive legislative framework, by adopting rules 
and developing comprehensive proposals to regulate these relations. It is better to let relations 
develop organically and there is no need to rush to finalise matters at this stage. 
 
Premier Phosa, Mpumalanga, “co-operative governance and the provinces”  
The IGR system is young. It has been in existence for five years and was restructured out of 
various bodies and divisions that existed before 1994. New structures have been created: the 
IGF, which is in charge of synergy between policies, the Premiers‟ Forum, and the MINMECs, 
which are specific to each area. In addition to these comprehensive forums, there is need to bring 
together on a specific basis provinces that are facing similar issues and provinces that wish to 
address inter-provincial matters, such as rivers. 
 
The Departments of Constitutional Development and of Finance must get involved in these inter-
provincial matters as well. All players in the field should work from the same policy basis, so as 
to prevent duplications and waste of resources. This would allow synergy between planning and 
budgeting, ensure budget discipline, and facilitate strategies to spend on capital projects rather 
than on personnel. The focus should be on operational mechanisms, co-ordination between 
spheres, synergy of policies, and public-private partnerships in service delivery supported by 
NGOs and international organisations. 
 
A system of co-operative governance is crucial to enable delivery, which should happen at the 
level closest to people. Co-ordination between local and provincial spheres of government is thus 
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essential, and local government should be represented at all levels. The involvement of civil 
society and grassroots structures is important as well, as they can assist in delivery through 
funding by the private sector and international donors. Provinces can contribute to relations with 
neighbouring countries through initiatives such as the Maputo Development Corridor. 
 
The principle behind these examples of co-operation is the need to create innovative 
arrangements to facilitate reconstruction and development, transform policies and institutions 
and put in place effective delivery mechanisms. We must go beyond formal institutional 
boundaries to focus on the tasks and use all available resources, on the basis of shared interests. 
 
There are questions that must be addressed in the framework of current IGR, such as the role of 
MINMECs, which override the decision of provincial legislatures and their role vis-à-vis 
provincial structures is unclear. Practical arrangement need not be legislated, and the focus 
should be on testing and developing them, without a restrictive formal framework. 
 
Ms Dube, SALGA, “co-operative governance and local government” 
Spheres of government are interdependent within a national framework, and inter-governmental 
structures give effect to the notion of co-operative governance. These structures must co-ordinate 
and align policies and efforts. These can be done through the NCOP, which needs vertical and 
horizontal links with other national, provincial and local structures. 
 
In some provinces initiatives are underway to co-ordinate efforts with local government, but they 
are not consistent and a framework is needed to regulate these matters. The provinces must help 
local governments, not undermine them, through building their capacity and developing 
financing mechanisms. 
 
The inter-governmental grants to local governments must be looked at to allow it to play a social 
and developmental role. This can be done through overhauling municipal finances, and putting in 
place new mechanisms that would give local government its equitable share and enable it to meet 
its tasks. The private sector should contribute to this as well. 
 
So far the experience of IGR has been good and a solid foundation to build upon has been 
created. However, the success of the system requires a flow of information that will feed into 
policy. A solution must be found to the problem of unfunded mandates, which leave local 
government with no money and no capacity to perform its functions. 
 
Mr Lekota, Chairperson of the NCOP, “the national council of provinces”  
The NCOP is the collective voice of the provinces. It forms part of a new culture of consultation, 
co-operation and mutual assistance. The notion of co-operative governance provides a 
conceptual foundation and the NCOP an institutional foundation for meeting the challenge of 
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implementing „unity in diversity‟. It is the only institution that brings together all spheres of 
government. 
 
The NCOP is a process, which can be seen either as a house of provinces that gives them a voice 
or as a mechanism that brings them into national processes. In fact it is both: it links different 
spheres by expressing provincial interests and concerns and providing a forum in which the 
provinces can discuss issues of relevance to them when deciding on national policy. The 
operation of MINMECs is problematic in this context, however. 
 
Provincial inputs on national legislation should be made through the provincial legislature, which 
confers a mandate on delegates to the NCOP, but provincial MECs frequently do not work 
through this channel. Rather they work through MINMECs, which are executive structures. In 
this way, there is no integration between the legislative and executive processes. Executives in 
the provinces should engage with their own legislatures. 
 
The NCOP should play a role in inter-governmental fiscal relations – provinces must have a say 
in deciding on how to divide their budget allocation, and the possibility of them raising their own 
funds should be explored. Other tasks of the NCOP relate to intervention in the provinces and 
municipalities when serious problem occur, dispute resolution and oversight of IGR. SALGA 
plays a role in the NCOP, and must have a voice in provincial legislatures as well. Organised 
local government should have a channel to the NCOP through the legislatures, and some of 
them, such as Gauteng, have arranged for that already. 
 
The NCOP has not done much in many of these areas due to its limited capacity and lack of 
experienced personnel. After the elections the NCOP must pursue these duties. It is an integral 
part of IGR, and has a clear role in the legislative process, which should be understood by its 
own members and other structures, and implemented accordingly. 
 
Premier Matsepe-Casaburri, Free State, “the role of IGR components in the 
provinces” 
There is no blueprint for IGR, except for the overall constitutional provision for three distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated spheres of government, and the principles of national unity and 
co-operative governance. In practice formal and informal processes operate, such as the 
MINMECs, which cut across formal provincial boundaries. 
 
In the provinces there is no effective co-ordination of IGR. The situation is fragmented, and the 
input of local government into provincial affairs is done in an ad-hoc manner. The MINMECs do 
not have a clear mandate and their input should be incorporated in a co-ordinated manner. 
Similarly there should be structured mechanisms for provincial input into the NCOP. The role of 
provinces in national bargaining chambers must be clarified as well. 
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It is important to have mechanisms of co-ordination between provincial and local spheres in 
issues such as spatial planning. Local government must be capacitated to allow its input to be 
made. The same is true for grassroots structures. There can be no participatory democracy if 
people are not able to articulate their concerns, and work in a way that is not affected by 
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures that block access and hamper delivery. 
 
New mechanisms are needed to deal with issues that are not handled by IGR structures at 
present. These involve co-operation with other countries (for example Free State and Lesotho, 
North-West and Botswana), to solve problems that affect all of them on an integrated basis and 
call for joint planning, such as taxi violence and HIV/AIDS. The general issue of delivering 
services to people from neighbouring countries must be dealt with as well in these forums. A 
range of issue that cannot be solved at the level of an individual province – policy regarding 
traditional leaders, crime, international syndicates – would be better handled through sharing 
knowledge and experience between provinces and local governments. Arrangements to pool 
resources, reduce waste and learn from each other should be put in place. 
 
Discussion  
Following the morning session, a discussion of the presentations took place from the floor, 
chaired by Rev. Frank Chikane. The main issues raised in the discussion are presented below. 
 
Unity and diversity 
One thread in the discussion addressed the need to balance between national policy and local and 
provincial implementation. The question of how to synchronise policy priorities at sub-national 
level, given that priorities are by definition local and specific, came up in this context. It was 
argued that local governments must consult and co-operate with each other but without following 
uniform priorities, and that provincial legislatures are not sub-units of the national parliament but 
autonomous entities. 
 
Mr Peter Miller from KwaZulu-Natal raised a similar point related to the provincial sphere. He 
argued that co-operative governance means working together without imposition from above. 
Provinces are separate political entities and not merely administrative units. There should be 
room for different policies in provinces based on their different circumstances. Otherwise the 
notion of provincial powers become meaningless. Mr Pieter Marais from the Western Cape 
reinforced this point, by calling for protecting the powers of the provinces. Inter-governmental 
relations must be built on principles on consensus, not majority control, and policy must allow 
for provincial differences to be expressed. 
 
MEC Jabu Moleketi of Gauteng argued in response that there is no need for ten different 
policies, but rather for one national policy that is flexible in its implementation due to local 
peculiarities and constraints. Flexibility should not be carried too far as to result in completely 
different direction though. 
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Local government and the provinces 
Another thread in the discussion that received great attention was the relation between local 
government and the provinces. MECs from some of the provinces rejected the notion that 
representatives of local government should physically sit in provincial legislatures as not being 
provided for by the constitution, though they acknowledged the need for a channel to allow them 
to voice their concerns. 
 
A representative of SALGA Mr Mokoena maintained that local government should participate at 
provincial legislature meetings when matters affecting them are discussed. sli 
 
Several participants emphasised the need for integrated development planning and service 
delivery that would allow co-ordination between local and provincial efforts, possibly through 
the creation of national and provincial offices at local level. 
 
Provinces and the NCOP 
The NCOP was criticised by MEC Miller from KwaZulu-Natal as not being a meaningful forum 
for the provinces. While it is good in theory, by the time it gets to discuss a bill from the 
perspective of the provinces, it is too late to change much. The NCOP should intervene early on, 
not at the end of the legislative process. This point was countered by Jacob Zuma from 
KwaZulu-Natal, who argued that debates at the NCOP can make a difference, but more time 
should be allowed for debate to make its input meaningful.    
 
A representative of the NCOP argued that provinces could intervene in early stages of debates on 
legislation and not wait for it to reach the NCOP. At the same time, the NCOP was criticised by 
others as being ineffectual and removed from concrete concerns such as the impact of legislation 
on budgets, implementation and delivery. 
 
Premier Motshekga of Gauteng asserted that MECs must participate in the provincial legislatures 
to inform them and help shape the mandate for the NCOP. Naledi Pandor of the NCOP called 
similarly for the provinces to make their input and ensure that their representatives convey these 
through the MINMECs, the NCOP and the national assembly. 
 
The extent to which the NCOP functions as a second house of parliament rather than as the voice 
of the provinces was questioned. One response was that the NCOP works through provincial 
mandates and it was up to the provinces to make use of the opportunity presented by it. 
 
MINMECs 
The issue of MINMECs proved to be particularly problematic. In principle MECs are answerable 
to the Premier and to the provincial legislature. However, the MEC for public works in the 
Northern Province Mr Chabane pointed out that there are issues in which MECs are answerable 
to the national minister in their area, and this makes matters more complicated. 
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Representatives of the NCOP argued that MECs should brief provincial legislatures about the 
MINMEC process, to allow them to participate in the policy debate. The MINMECs shold not be 
used to bypass the NCOP process. Premier Mothsekga referred to this as two parallel policy-
making processes, that must be integrated to be efficient. 
 
MEC Moleketi pointed out though that MINMECs are important as forums for exchange of 
ideas, debate and moving forward in creative ways 
 
Interventions 
Peter Miller of KwaZulu-Natal that section 139 of the constitution, which governs the 
intervention of a province in a local government, is not workable, as it is too cumbersome in its 
procedures. Mr Mokoena of SALGA countered by saying that the section reflects the spirit of 
co-operative governance, and it protects the sphere of local government. it should encourage 
provincial government to support local government through the provision of financial assistance 
but also through provision of technical skills and human resource capacity. 
 
General issues 
A need was expressed for forums to discuss issues that cut across departments, such as water, 
that involves in addition to water, questions of sanitation, health, agriculture, etc, which fall 
under different departments. 
 
A point about capacity that was made by a number of participants, in response to criticisms of 
the provinces by national representatives was that lack of capacity affects all spheres of 
government, not just provincial and local government but the national government as well. 
 
The session was concluded by Rev. Chikane, who argued that most of discussion reflected issues 
related to implementation rather than to principle. 
 
SECOND SESSION, 29/3/1999 
 
Professor Levy, “policy on intergovernmental relations” 
The legacy of IGR under the previous regime does not provide much to build on. That is why 
there is a need for an IGR audit. The audit will give a precise picture of the state of IGR at 
present, how institutions work in practice and how effective they are. On that basis we can move 
towards putting in place a viable system in line with the constitution. 
 
The crucial areas that need to be studied include the operation and structures of IGR institutions; 
the strategic role and potential of IGR institutions; operational linkages; inter-sectoral relations; 
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dispute resolution mechanisms; the use of information technology to monitor performance. The 
audit will be carried out between March and December 1999, and will assess the interface 
between different spheres of government. 
 
Among the issues to be examined is the role of the Inter-Governmental Forum which, although it 
is central to IGR and co-operative governance, cannot deal with all the issues arising in this 
context. Its relations to the NCOP are unclear. The role of the MINMECs should e clarified as 
well – are they consultative or decision-making structures. 
 
Mr Momoniat, Fiscal and Financial Commission, “intergovernmental fiscal 
relations” 
The principle of co-operative governance means an obligation of different spheres of 
government to work together, through consultation rather than litigation. It is important to realise 
in this context that the three spheres are governments rather than administration, and that they 
have exclusive as well as concurrent powers. 
 
In the field of fiscal and financial relations, the constitution mandates a revenue-sharing 
programme, which gives each sphere of government its equitable share out of funds raised at the 
national level, and allows it to raise additional funds through taxation and other measures. Such 
funds account for 4% of the income of the provinces and 90% of local government income. 
 
All funds are used to perform functions in relation to which spheres of government have 
exclusive and concurrent powers. Unfunded mandates result from lack of co-ordination between 
different spheres which have concurrent powers over certain areas such as health and education, 
and they should be avoided.. 
 
The new budget process is more decentralised. It involves longer-term planning through the 
Mid-Term Economic Framework (MTEF), and it discourages bailouts of one sphere by another. 
However, it relies on proper financial management, which does not always exist. Recent 
legislation such as the Public Financial Management Act aims to improve this situation. 
 
Mr Morobe, Fiscal and Financial Commission, “intergovernmental fiscal relations” 
There is need for efficiency, transparency and accountability, and a new culture of behaviour 
conforming to the constitutional principles. Since 1994 a process of transformation has been put 
in place, based on strategies to deal with fiscal issues in the context of socio-economic realities, 
and the need to utilise resources efficiently and responsibly. The role of the FFC is to contribute 
through research and analysis to the task of distributing resources equitably in a way that 
empowers all stakeholders. 
 
A review of the experience of IGR with a focus on finances would allow the new government to 
proceed with the task of putting in place equitable fiscal relations. We have to ask ourselves 
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whether it is efficient to have so many IGR forums in place, and whether people in these 
structures understand the technical language used in discussions. There is need for more 
transparency in the process. 
 
Professor Espin, University of Castilla-La Mancha, “models for intergovernmental 
relations: Spain” 
Intergovernmental relations in Spain consist primarily of relations between the central state and 
the regions or „Autonomous Communities‟. Both central and regional governments may exercise 
powers concerning the same issues. There is no formal mechanism to ensure co-ordination 
between these spheres in the Senate, but voluntary techniques are used to achieve this goal, 
although not mandated by the constitution. The use of these practical mechanisms has led to the 
reduction of conflict. 
 
While the Spanish federal system gives extensive powers to the regions, it retains the unity of a 
national judiciary, and recognises only administrative autonomy for provinces and 
municipalities. This means autonomy with regard to hiring, directing and supervising employees 
and the power to issue local ordinances, but no autonomy with regard to policy and legislation. 
In this latter respect they are subordinate to the central and regional governments. 
 
Discussion 
Following these presentations, a discussion session ensued. It consisted of inputs by a panel of 
discussants and from the floor, after which the presenters where given a chance to respond. 
 
Professor Swartz, University of Fort Hare 
The IGR audit would assess the structure and capacities of institutions against the constitutional 
provisions and government policy. There are critical capacity shortages that must be addressed, 
as well as other issues such as human resources and managerial capabilities, especially at 
provincial and local levels. Conflict between spheres is another important issue: it can be 
mediated and managed but not eliminated altogether. 
 
The audit needs to look at power as a relational arrangement (not a zero-sum game), where the 
different components interrelate. Devolution and decentralisation have strategic implications: 
dispersed power means that more resources should be allocated to co-ordination to arrive at 
strategic cohesion. Government must be brought closet to the people through devolution of 
power, but without undermining the unity of the state. 
 
Other important issues to look at are the need for symmetry under conditions of differential 
capacity of the components of each governmental sphere, and the pace of reform which should 
not be too fast so as to overtake the limited capacity of the system to absorb reform. 
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Professor Lawrence, University of Natal 
The Spanish model can offer useful lessons from a comparative perspective. It is a move from a 
hierarchical to a devolved system, based on competence – what each sphere can do – rather than 
on abstract principles. It is asymmetrical – it gives different powers to the regions based on their 
ability to perform, rather than on principled equality that does not correspond to the varying 
capacities of spheres. There is no prescriptive legislation and too many formal structures to 
regulate relations, but rather agreements between sectors, which evolve into practical 
arrangements. There is concern with feasibility – there is no setting-up of hollow mechanisms 
that are being filled with content later on. 
 
In the discussion that followed, a number of themes were raised from the floor. Some of the key 
threads were as follows. 
 
Capacity 
Questions were raised about how effective the budgetary process has been, and what is the 
capacity of government to manage finances, train people, and get them involved in the process. 
To ensure that people get involved and become interested in building their own capacity, they 
need to be motivated by a coherent vision, though Premier Matsepe-Casaburry commented that 
such visions is difficult to develop given provincial disparities. The need for performance 
indicators was pointed out as well. 
 
Budget process 
MEC Miller from KwaZulu-Natal commended the financial component of IGR as being clear, 
successful and in line with the constitution. The budgeting process is more equitable and there 
are fewer unfunded mandates. Although provincial taxation powers are not sorted out yet, 
provinces are entitled to their share of national resources by right. 
The division of the budget according to the 85%-15% formula was questioned as interfering with 
the need to deal with infrastructural backlogs in areas other than health, education, and welfare. 
 
Asymmetry 
Asymmetrical devolution of power could lead to uneven development, and increase the already 
wide gaps between provinces. Provinces that lack capacity need assistance from the national 
sphere, though national government itself does not always have the capacity. The enormous 
differences between provinces must be considered when equitable share is allocated to them. 
 
After points were made from the floor, the presenters were given an opportunity to respond. 
 
Mr Momoniat explained that the equitable share formula takes into consideration backlogs, 
uneven resources and poverty. The formula allocated money to the provinces as a bulk sum, and 
the provinces can decide how to allocate the money to different areas. The 85%-15% formula 
applied to sectors (health, education, welfare), and the relevant departments can decide on how 
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to distribute it internally (between personnel, services, infrastructure). The system is evolving 
and the challenge is to learn from experience and adjust. Putting in place a good information 
system is essential to enable sound decisions. 
 
Professor Levy clarified that Local government would feature in the audit, though there are not 
many IGR institutions in this sphere, and it is complicated. the question of absorptive capacity to 
deal with reform is important – too many reforms implemented too quickly can result in 
destabilisation. There is need to deal with different interpretation of „concurrent‟ powers, and 
workshop the findings of the audit with all stakeholders to instil a sense of ownership of the 
process and the results. 
 
Mr Morobe pointed out that equitable share is not the same as overall equity. The FFC formula is 
a tool in moving towards greater equity than in the past. It is meant to give provinces an 
allocation that is based on a certain understanding of their needs, but they have the freedom to 
use the allocation as they choose (within limits). Conditional grants allow national government 
to advance certain policy objectives, though provincial governments can affect decisions within 
this framework. 
 
FIRST SESSION, 30/3/1999 
Mr Titus, Department of Constitutional Development, “perspectives on the present 
state of provincial governance” 
Mr Titus stressed the need to implement co-operative governance. He emphasised the 
importance of moving beyond sectional and local interests and working towards national 
interests.  
 
A number of challenges facing IGR were identified. These included finding alternative service 
delivery modes, maintaining infrastructure, developing human resource capacity, dealing with 
personnel costs and budgets, responding to provincial reports in a co-ordinated manner, and 
putting in place adequate monitoring and supervising mechanisms. 
 
Monitoring and supervising mechanisms should allow us to look at the relations between policy 
goals and performance. Indicators for monitoring should be developed jointly by national and 
provincial governments, be transparent, agreed upon, be either formal or informal, and be piloted 
before being implemented. 
 
Overall, provinces have performed well considering the problems they have had to face. 
Questions about the present state of provincial government, whether provinces are doing what 
was planned and were these original plans feasible or do they need to be revised, have to be 
addressed. 
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Mr Gordhan, “provincial powers and good governance” 
Mr Gordhan questioned whether provincial government has been used effectively to achieve 
good governance. The current system of government was designed to enhance cohesion and 
unity, maximise co-operation and minimise conflict, bring government closer to the people, 
ensure effective provincial powers to make a difference on the ground, recognise the role of local 
government and extent democracy across all spheres. 
 
Criteria for achieving good governance included making a difference on the ground, efficient 
management of all resources, ensuring effective services, instilling a developmental ethic, 
contributing towards nation building, reducing tension and conflict, promoting the development 
of a democratic political and civic culture and developing local government.  
 
In order to assess if provincial powers have been used to achieve good governance the post-1994 
period must be divided into two. The first two and a half years were a learning experience 
characterised by clarifying powers and identifying areas where these powers were to be 
exercised. The second two and a half year period was characterised by greater stability, 
rationalisation of structures, improving financial management, developing greater capacity, and 
making the provincial voice more effective within the NCOP. All in all a better provincial 
system was developed during this period. 
 
The challenges for the future are to ensure efficient delivery and give greater content and 
meaning to co-operative governance. Resources at different spheres should be co-ordinated to 
avoid duplication. Provinces should make better and greater use of their legislative powers, 
which may include the powers of taxation as well. 
 
Premier Ramathlodi, Northern Province 
MINMECs diminished the powers of provincial government since decisions made within these 
structures often become binding on the provinces without their involvement. To avoid this MECs 
should be mandated before attending these meetings and not take decisions that are binding on 
the province without proper consultation. 
 
By building capacity at local government, provinces will be able to focus on other areas like 
policy development and monitoring. The incorporation of traditional leaders into local 
government should be considered as well. 
 
Premier Mtshali, KwaZulu-Natal 
The present system of government has reached a crossroad presenting us with an opportunity to 
evaluate and redefine the role of provincial government. Currently the system is a hybrid of 
federal and unitary principles, combing the weaknesses of both principles and not doing enough 
to incorporate their strengths. 
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Devolution of power to allow greater involvement of the provinces in government is essential. 
Currently the national sphere dominates through legislation, resource allocation and rules and 
regulations. Provinces are marginalised, their legislatures lack the power to pass laws, and policy 
differentiation at provincial level is inhibited. Provinces have become sub-committees of the 
NCOP, merely implementing national policy. This leaves little room to be innovative and play a 
role in creatively meeting the specific needs of their constituencies. Operating in this fashion 
renders provinces ineffective and costly. 
 
Provinces should be given more powers and allowed to differ on policy issues. Power and 
capacity should be decentralised to regional and district levels and guided and monitored by the 
provinces, taking into account differing policy positions. This would ensure that provinces are 
not caught between national and local government. Unity in diversity is essential and the best 
route towards good governance. 
 
Premier Molefe, North West 
The legacy of the past has made the combination of unitary and federal systems of government a 
necessity. Although provincial governments have their own views they should be encouraged to 
work in consensus to deliver services and alleviate poverty. Responsibilities within the three 
spheres of government overlap, but the powers of each sphere are not derived from national 
government, and national government has limited authority to override these powers. In this 
context provincial governments are the main implementers of service delivery with policy-
making powers in specific areas. 
 
Good governance is a process that brings together antagonistic forces with similar aims. It is the 
ability to deliver services to diverse constituencies with diverse interests, through interaction and 
engagement and the use of legislative capacity and mediation of various interests. 
 
There is a need for decentralisation and accountability in the area of service delivery. There 
should be a move away from controlling society to serving it. Residents at both local and 
provincial level must be allowed to participate in decision making, to enhance the legitimacy and 
accountability of the political system. 
 
Co-operative government has been working well despite political differences. In some areas 
provincial powers are contingent on prior action by national government. This results in 
provinces not being able to move fast even if they have the capacity to do so, and they have to 
wait for national legislation. The provinces may be subject to negative public perception when 
delivery does not happen even if it is not their fault. National norms and standards should not 
block provincial initiatives. The role of the NCOP should thus be seen within the context of 
developing capacity and creating a support system at provincial and local levels.  
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MEC Marais, Western Cape 
MEC Marais emphasised that fear of domination undermined the ideals of intergovernmental co-
operation. Diversity within shared values must be recognised. The powers of the provinces are 
limited as the constitution is too centralist. The emphasis on uniformity does not allow for the 
consideration of uniqueness of the different populations and concerns. 
 
MINMECs should be abolished in favour of inter-provincial forums. This would allow for the 
expression of real provincial viewpoints. This does not happen within the NCOP, because all 
delegates to the NCOP vote according to mandates from their political parties. 
 
The focus of IGR should be on asymmetry and subsidiarity, taking into consideration the 
province‟s capacity to exercise powers and develop cross-province alliances. National control is 
not efficient, but provinces should have extended powers to help local government and 
neighbouring provinces where they can.  
 
Discussion 
Powers of provinces and premiers 
One of the issues raised from the floor highlighted different perceptions of the extent of 
provincial powers. Some speakers claimed that provinces did not have sufficient power while 
others felt that these powers were too extensive. 
 
According to Mr Lekota provinces have considerable powers to legislate through the NCOP but 
often do not make use of this facility. He also made the point that delegates to the NCOP should 
get their mandates from the provincial legislature and not from their political parties, as there are 
issues that affect the province as a whole and not just the political party. In response, MEC 
Marais said that only minor amendments to bills occur through the NCOP, and no substantial 
changes. 
 
Premier Ramathlodi made the point that the role of the premiers‟ forum should be extended, and 
Mr Gordhan suggested that the forum should agree on the criteria to evaluate good governance, 
and the performance of provinces will measured accordingly. 
 
There are difficulties in clearly differentiating provincial versus national powers and a need was 
expressed for more clarity in this regard. However, both Mr. Gordhan and Premier Molefe 
suggested that given that the system is new, it should be allowed to develop, and that the lessons 
of its experience should be studied before rushing t formulate legislation in the field of IGR.  
 
Unfunded mandates and norms and standards 
Policies, norms and standards are often set at national level without careful consideration of their 
budgetary implications. Provinces are then faced with unfunded mandates. National norms and 
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standards should not be finalised without proper consultation with the provinces. It was felt that 
this would go a long way in reducing the problem of unfunded mandates. 
 
There was a suggestion that norms and standards not be legislated. Premier Ramathlodi asserted 
that although regional differentiation is a fact, there is a need for national norms and standards. 
These national norms and standards should allow for provincial flexibility and initiative, 
however.  
 
Capacity 
The issue of capacity was discussed in relation to financial management. It was stressed that the 
MTEF be implemented only once sufficient capacity existed. Premier Mtshali reiterated this 
point by adding that capacity building and allocation of resources are crucial. 
 
Efficiency versus effectiveness 
The issue of cost effectiveness and efficient service delivery within the context of the present 
system was raised. There was a suggestion that each area of delivery be examined separately to 
establish whether the national or provincial sphere has more capacity to deliver. Concern was 
also expressed that financial management that sticks rigidly to fiscal targets could compromise 
social delivery. 
 
SECOND SESSION, 30/3/1999   
Dr Ncholo, Department of Public Service and Administration, “provincial capacity 
and service delivery” 
Public service delivery has to a large extent been successful in spite of the problems inherited 
from the previous administration. The constitution mandates an efficient public service, which is 
currently in the process of being transformed. This transformation of the public service falls 
within the terrain of national government. 
 
The emphasis on compliance to rules needs to be shifted to a focus on delivery. The public 
service should strive to deliver in an efficient and transparent manner. The importance of this 
was stressed since the public service is the interface between government and the public.  
 
Standards need to be stated clearly and adhered to, taking into account financial, human and 
organisational constraints. In addition there is a need to institute mechanisms for redress and 
accountability. The public service administration does not see a need to give more powers to the 
provinces but rather to address capacity and will to perform. A performance management system 
based on clear identification of goals, capacity, budget and planning should be put in place. 
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Mr Mokgoro, North West, “provincial capacity and serviced” 
The lack of action in spite of the plethora of policies has highlighted the need to focus on 
operationalising these policies. This is dependent on leadership having the capacity to exercise 
their power wisely. Wisdom, derived from experience, is in short supply, often leading to abuse 
of power and coercion of subservient officials. There is often willingness to transform, but often 
this is not accompanied by the ability to make this transformation. 
 
Mr Gross, Scientific Institute for Democracy, “a new political culture as a source of 
good governance in the provinces” 
Mr Gross‟s input on the Swiss experience illustrated how a federal state can unify rather than 
divide. The federal system was used to help the provinces or cantons stay together and at the 
same time maintain their diversity. The two-chamber system ensures that citizens as well as 
cantons have an equal stake and say in government. Laws must be ratified by a majority in both 
chambers. 
 
Switzerland‟s use of referendums encourages on-going political debate and exchanges. This 
results in a more representative government since citizens are encouraged to speak and 
government to listen. The endorsement of people‟s willingness to discuss their differences leads 
to further integration. This also leads to the civilisation of conflict and it discourages the use of 
violence.  
 
It was suggested that IGR be thought of in the context of relations between citizens, where the 
state is only one actor among others. The Swiss experience shows that unity and diversity are not 
necessarily contradictory and that often diversity can strengthen and unify. 
 
Discussion 
Co-operative interrelations 
The implications of a more political intervention into administration, and vice versa, were raised 
in the discussion. The blurred interface between senior officials and politicians had led to the 
resignation of a number of DGs. Dr Ncholo responded by saying that in South Africa there is no 
distinction between senior politicians and administrators in terms of their responsibilities for 
policy making. 
 
Capacity 
A suggestion was put forward to co-ordinate better capacity and resources that are sometimes 
available but not always utilised. This highlighted the need for the notion of „capacity‟ to be 
unpacked, formulated, implemented and managed more effectively. 
 
A contradictory position put forward from the floor was that one of the threats facing the public 
service was the lack of capacity to handle transformation. This was especially the case with 
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regard to the application of affirmative action. It is therefore important to empower people and 
provide them with an enabling environment where they can learn from their mistakes. 
 
MEC Moleketi, Gauteng, “financial and infrastructural backlogs” 
Infra-structural backlogs should be financed from the regular operational budget of departments, 
within the limits of sound fiscal policies. There is no separate budget for this investment and it 
should become a regular component in each department‟s budget. This is difficult given the high 
proportion of the budget that is spent on personnel costs. 
 
Although there is no specific provision for dealing with backlogs in the provincial allocation, 
preference is given to more rural provinces, as the extent of „ruralness‟ is used as a proxy for 
needs. This favours some provinces regardless of the actual backlogs, and urban provinces like 
Gauteng suffer as a result. The actual backlogs in each province should be used rather. 
 
Creative solutions to the question of funding infra-structural backlogs must be found, through 
using the provincial allocation, conditional grants, partnerships with the private sector and other 
arrangements (user fees, sale and leaseback of state assets, etc.)  
 
Professor Steytler, Wits University, “Section 139 and 100 interventions” 
Professor Steytler‟s paper focused on the provisions made in Sections 100 and 139 of the 
constitution for circumstances in which national government can intervene in the affairs of 
provincial government, and a provincial government can intervene in the affairs of a local 
government. It is essential that these powers be carefully looked at and procedures clarified and 
developed in consultation with provinces. 
 
National government‟s right to intervene should be used cautiously and be seen as a corrective 
measure seeking to cure. Intervention should be temporary, supportive and must be reviewed by 
the NCOP. The affected province should be included in this process, bearing in mind that the 
goal of intervention is to harmonise the relations between provincial and national spheres of 
government. The NCOP, in addition to reviewing the intervention, bears the responsibility of 
determining who would pay for the cost of the intervention. In most instances this will depend on 
the nature of the conflict. The NCOP also has the power to set aside the intervention if it 
disapproves of it.  
 
Discussion 
Need for guidelines 
A representative from the NCOP argued that even though the ability to meet its obligations 
depended on a local government‟s capacity, there is need for a set of guidelines to evaluate the 
performance of municipalities. The absence of these guidelines makes it difficult to distinguish 
between the legislative and executive functions of the municipalities, thus creating vague 
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conditions for intervention. In addition, there was a call for guidelines on how to operate in cases 
of intervention. 
 
According to Professor Steytler the constitutional obligations of local government need to be 
clarified and defined. Furthermore, he argued that there should be a uniform set of standards for 
intervention.  
 
Capacity and timeframe 
The issue of timeframes set in Section 139 was raised by a representative from the NCOP. A 
point put forward was that the period of 30 days allocated for responding to problems was too 
short. In addition, the limited capacity within the NCOP to deal with problems created further 
pressure. Professor Steytler responded by saying that timeframes for intervention depended on 
when a complaint was registered. He agreed that timeframes and the rules for review set clearly. 
 
Developing capacity was further identified in the context of intervention. There was a suggestion 
by SALGA that since the cost of remedial action is high, capacity building should accompany 
any form of remedial action in the hope that the same problems do not recur. 
 
There was a suggestion to invest in training and that this should be made compulsory. Finance 
management and personnel issues in particular should be addressed in this type of training, thus 
reducing the incidence of resignation at senior level. The Gauteng MEC for finance agreed that 
there was a need to develop the capacity of senior management and office bearers. 
 
Overspending and backlogs 
The Free State MEC for finance argued that provinces often overspend due to debts inherited 
from the previous administration and also because of having to deal with backlogs and incorrect 
baseline figures. The over expenditure results in provinces having to call on national government 
to intervene. Mr Moleketi, the Gauteng MEC for finance, reported that the current baseline 
figures are more accurate. He added that although banks have reacted to the statements made by 
government that national government will no longer bail out provincial government, the 
provinces are in a position to make alternative arrangements. 
 
Delivery and infrastructure 
The question was posed whether the problem of backlogs was not compounded by the separation 
of infrastructure from social service delivery. MEC Moleketi responded by saying that delivery 
and infrastructure are related and that provinces can prioritise infrastructure in areas of delivery 
such as health, education and welfare. This means increasing capital expenditure at the expense 
of operational expenditure, for example cutting on items such as drugs, etc. 
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Minister Moosa, Department of Constitutional Development, concluding remarks 
Minister Moosa delivered the closing address at the conference. He emphasised that few 
provincial or national departments had the capacity to run affairs at lower levels, and that the 
NCOP should therefore be seen in this context. He stressed that most interventions are based on 
co-operation and that intervention cannot be successful if provinces do not want it.  
 
IGR and co-operative governance are mechanisms set out by the constitution to achieve equity, 
to promote the RDP, nation building, and unification. The objective of the conference is to put 
forward a policy on the matters discussed, for example guidelines for NCOP interventions and so 
on. Furthermore, this policy will inform a new way forward for IGR structures  
 
The Minster acknowledged that the role of the NCOP was limited, especially in relation to 
legislation since the NCOP was the last stage in discussing legislation. He questioned whether 
this should be changed. There seemed to be a general agreement that there was no need to rush 
into legislation but rather continue relying on emerging convention based on consensus. 
 
The Minister suggested that the relationship between MINMECs and provincial cabinets could 
improve if the cycle within which they operated changed. MINMECs should not take decisions 
that would have financial implications for provinces. Although the DCD was not in charge of 
provinces, the possibility that the DCD monitor, co-ordinate and build capacity at provincial 
level should be explored. 
 
The Minister concluded by saying that the relations between senior officials in both the national 
and provincial spheres should be looked at to improve the overall functioning of the IGR system. 
 
